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Abstract 
Since the 1960s both crime rates and the share of immigrants among the American population 
have more than doubled. Almost three quarters of Americans believe immigration increases 
crime, yet existing academic research has shown no such effect. Using panel data on US counties 
from 1980 to 2000, this paper presents empirical evidence on a systematic and economically 
meaningful impact of immigration on crime. Consistent with the economic model of crime this 
effect is strongest for crimes motivated by financial gain, such as motor vehicle theft and 
robbery. Moreover, the effect is only present for those immigrants most likely to have poor labor 
market outcomes. Failure to account for the cost of increased crime would overstate the 
“immigration surplus” substantially, but would most likely not reverse its sign.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II the flow of legal immigrants into the US has steadily increased. 
Consequently the share of immigrants in the whole population more than doubled between 1960 
and 2000. Figures 1 and 2 document this trend.1 As can be seen in Figure 3, this time period 
coincided with a four-fold increase in violent crimes. Property crime rates shot up by a factor of 
three and subsequently fell to two times their base level. 
Cities associated with above average shares of immigrants, such as Los Angeles, New York, 
Miami, or Chicago, are often portrayed as crime-ridden in mainstream media; and among the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) “Most Wanted Fugitives” the foreign-born are vastly 
overrepresented. Similarly, of the roughly 125,000 Cuban immigrants reaching Florida during 
the Mariel boatlift approximately 7,600 had been incarcerated on US soil in 1987 (Hamm 1995).2 
It comes to no surprise that Americans hold strong opinions on the impact of immigration on 
crime. When asked what they think will happen as a consequence of more immigrants coming to 
the US, 73.4% of respondents to the General Social Survey in 2000 thought it was “very likely” 
or “somewhat likely” that crime rates would increase. 
Casual empiricism suggests a link between immigration and criminal activity. Figures 4A 
and 4B plot the natural logarithm of property crime rates and violent crime rates against the 
logarithm of the share of immigrants. There exists a large positive correlation between 
immigration and both property crimes as well as violent crimes. Implicitly accounting for county 
fixed effects, Table 1 tells a slightly different story. While property crime rates decreased more 
in counties that experienced a smaller relative increase in the share of immigrants, no clear 
pattern is discernible for violent crimes. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Substantial uncertainty surrounds estimates of the number of illegal immigrants. A common estimate is 12.5 
million for 2007. 
2 A significant fraction of the Marielitos had been convicted criminals in Cuba.  
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Absent positive selection among immigrants, there are a priori reasons to believe that 
immigration may affect crime rates. Immigrants are disproportionately male and between the 
ages of 15 and 35. Existing research has shown these groups to be especially likely to be 
involved in criminal activity (Freeman 1999). 
The economic theory of crime pioneered by Becker (1968) predicts that, all else equal, 
individuals with lower outside options commit more crime. Low levels of education, low wages, 
higher unemployment rates, and difficulties assimilating have all been documented for 
immigrants and can reasonably be associated with lower outside options—at least if one regards 
legal labor market employment as the relevant margin.3 
Another channel through which immigration may affect crime are spillover effects. Even if 
immigrants themselves commit fewer crimes than observationally similar natives, immigration 
could cause an increase in crime if it reduces natives’ labor market opportunities inducing them 
to substitute toward criminal activity.4 
Although there exist extensive literatures on the economics of immigration (reviewed in 
Borjas 1999) and on the economics of crime (see Freeman 1999 for a survey), relatively little is 
known about the impact of immigration on crime. The existing evidence relies in large part on 
incarceration rates as proxy for involvement in criminal activity, and is not always consistent.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 On the other side, expected costs of committing a crime are arguably higher for immigrants. Not only do they face 
the same set of punishments as natives, they are also subject to deportation, which likely is an additional deterrent. 
4 Although most studies have found only small effects of immigration on native’s wages and employment, it should 
be noted that this question has not yet been fully resolved in the literature (see Card 2001 and Borjas 2003 for 
opposing results). 
5 In the US Census information on the institutionalized population is highly unreliable, as it is often based on 
administrative data or imputed. In a review of the 2000 Census the National Research Council (2004) found that for 
53.0% of the prison population information on country of birth had to be imputed. Jonas (2003) shows that only 
19.7% of individuals in correctional institutions filled out the Census form themselves or were interviewed by a 
Census enumerator, while 56.3% of answers are based on administrative data, and 24.0% result in non-response. 
While the foreign-born are underrepresented among the institutionalized population in the Census, recent reports by 
different government agencies seem to contradict this fact. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (2009), for instance, 
reports that 73.5% of inmates in federal prisons are native born. This means that 26.5% must have come to the US as 
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Moehling and Piehl (2009) study incarceration rates of immigrants and natives during the 
first half of the 20th century and uncover only very small differences between the two groups. 
Similarly, Butcher and Piehl (1998a, 2007) find that since the 1980s immigrants are less likely to 
be incarcerated than natives, and attribute this finding to positive selection among immigrants. 
Immigrants represent a disproportionate share of inmates with drug related offenses (Butcher and 
Piehl 2000). While Grogger (1998) finds little evidence for spillover effects, Borjas, Grogger and 
Hanson (2010) argue that immigration caused unemployment and a decline in wages among 
black men, thereby leading to an increase in incarceration rates for this group. The paper most 
closely related to the present one is Butcher and Piehl (1998b). In a panel of forty-three 
metropolitan areas during the 1980s, they find no effect of immigration on overall rates of crime 
as well as on violent crime rates.6 
The results presented in this paper, however, lead to a different conclusion. Using decadal 
panel data on US counties from 1980 to 2000 and UCR crime data, this paper contributes to the 
existing literature by presenting empirical evidence on a systematic impact of immigration on 
crime. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
immigrants. Camarota and Jensenius (2009) provide an overview of existing data on the immigration status of 
prisoners and known issues associated with this data. 
Deportations of immigrants might also affect relative rates of imprisonment. During the 2008 fiscal year circa 
359,000 aliens were deported based on an order of removal (US Department of Homeland Security 2009). This 
number does not include illegal aliens captured by the US Border Patrol who returned voluntarily to their home 
country. Of deportations due to involvement in criminal activity approximately 34% are related to drug offenses, 
22% to immigration violations, and 22% to index crimes (US Department of Homeland Security 2008). Butcher and 
Piehl (1998a) argue that deportations cannot explain the discrepancy in incarceration rates between immigrants and 
natives found in the Census data. 
6 There are several possible explanations for why Butcher and Piehl’s (1998b) results are at odds with those 
presented in this paper. Their sample covers the 1980s, while this papers also considers the 1990s. Tables 8A and 8B 
indicate that the impact of immigration on crime is concentrated in the latter period. Moreover, Butcher and Piehl do 
not consider property crime separately from violent crime, and control for the fraction of a metropolitan area’s 
population that is Hispanic. In their regressions of crime rates on immigration and different sets of covariates the 
coefficient of Fraction Hispanic is always positive, in most cases economically sizeable, and larger in absolute value 
than that on Fraction New Immigrants. 
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Least squares estimates suggest a large positive and statistically significant effect of 
immigration on property crime. A 10% increase in the share of immigrants, i.e. slightly more 
than one percentage point based on current numbers, is estimated to lead to an increase in the 
property crime rate of 1.2%. To put this into perspective, an elasticity of .12 implies that the 
average immigrant commits roughly 2.5 times as many property crimes as the average native. 
Point estimates of the elasticity of the violent crime rate with respect to the share of 
immigrants are only half as big in magnitude and sometimes negative, but statistically 
undistinguishable from zero. These estimates control for county and year fixed effects as well as 
for changes in a host of county characteristics over time, are robust to including county fixed 
effects in growth rates, and hold in various subsamples of the data. 
Decomposing property crimes and violent crimes into their respective components—i.e. 
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft for the former; murder, rape, aggravated assault and 
robbery for the latter—shows that immigration increases each type of property crime as well as 
robberies, but has almost no effect on rates of rape and aggravated assault. The point estimate 
with respect to murder is large and positive, but depends on the weighting scheme. Consistent 
with the economic model of crime, it appears that immigration primarily increases crimes 
motivated by financial gain. Moreover, splitting up immigrants into those from Mexico and “all 
others” reveals that the effect is only present for former group. As immigrants from Mexico are 
particularly likely to experience poor labor market outcomes, this finding is consistent with the 
economic model of crime as well. 
Despite the robustness of this pattern and its concordance with the predictions of economic 
theory, thorny issues of causality remain. Measurement error in the number of immigrants, 
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omitted variables, and endogeneity in immigrants’ settlement patterns could all bias the least 
squares estimates. 
Following Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001) this paper instruments for the actual 
change in the number of immigrants with a prediction thereof based on ethnic differences in 
settlement patterns (Bartel 1989). The prediction exploits geographic and ethnic dispersion in the 
distribution of immigrants across counties as well as the changing ethnic composition of 
immigrants. Intuitively, validity of the instrument requires that differences in the geographic 
distribution across immigrant groups, and total inflows of different groups are uncorrelated with 
shocks to crime in particular counties. The resulting two stage least squares estimates confirm 
the basic pattern. That is, immigration has a large positive impact on property crime, but not on 
violent crime. 
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that the social cost of increased crime due to a 
counterfactual 10% percent increase in the fraction of immigrants amount to as much as 1.7 
billion dollars per year. Despite substantial uncertainty associated with this cost estimate, it alone 
is most likely too small to outweigh welfare gains to immigration produced elsewhere in the 
economy.7 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains mechanisms by which immigration can 
be expected to affect crime. Section III describes and summarizes the data, followed by the main 
results presented in Section IV. Section V discusses implications for public policy, and Section 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 It has long been recognized that, all else equal, immigration generates a net increase in natives’ welfare by its 
impact on the labor market (see the exposition in Borjas 1999). Immigration is also likely to increase ethnic diversity 
in goods and services, and may thereby increase natives’ welfare (see Lazear 2000). On the other hand, immigrants 
have been found to be more reliant on government transfers (e.g. Borjas and Hilton 1996). The National Research 
Council (1997) estimates the fiscal impact of immigration and finds that each immigrant initially creates a burden 
for the taxpayer. This burden, however, turns into a large surplus over the long run. 
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VI concludes. A Data Appendix with the precise definitions and sources of all variables used in 
the analysis is also provided. 
 
II. MECHANISMS BY WHICH IMMIGRATION MAY AFFECT CRIME 
There are multiple mechanisms by which an increase in the number of immigrants may affect 
crime. The first and most obvious one is a purely mechanical population effect. Since the 
expected per capita number of committed crimes is positive, an influx of immigrants can be 
expected to increase the total number of crimes simply because it increases the population. 
As it is not clear whether policy makers should be concerned about population effects, and 
since data on the immigration status of victims is unavailable, the empirical work in this paper 
does not take population effects into account. Instead it focuses on the relationship between 
crime rates and the share of immigrants. 
Crime rates could be affected by composition effects. Immigrants are disproportionately 
male and between the ages of 15 and 35 (US Census Bureau 2009), and these population groups 
are well known to be involved in criminal activity more frequently than others (Freeman 1999).8 
Therefore, an influx of immigrants can be expected to increase crime rates—even if conditional 
on observables natives and immigrants have equal propensities to commit crime. 
Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the economic theory of crime points to two other 
mechanisms by which immigration can be expected to affect crime. In Becker’s words, 
“… a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could 
get by using his time and other resources at other activities. Some persons become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Representing only 28% of the population, individuals between the ages of 15 and 35 accounted for 64% of all 
arrests in 2002. Of all persons arrested in 2002 for violent crimes 83% were male, as were 69% of those arrested for 
property crimes (US Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004). It should be noted that among recent immigrant cohorts 
gender ratios have been much more balanced than for previous ones. 
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“criminals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other 
persons, but their benefits and costs differ.” (Becker 1968, p. 176) 
Thus, immigration has an impact on crime if immigrants’ outside options differ from those of 
natives, or if the expected utility from committing a crime differs between the two groups. Not 
only does the total number of crimes change in such a case, but the crime rate changes as well. 
The crime rate increases if the marginal immigrant commits more crimes than the average 
American. 
While the marginal immigrant is hard to determine empirically, there is ample evidence that 
the average immigrant’s outside option is worse than that of the average native if legal sector 
employment is considered to be the relevant alternative. On average immigrants are less 
educated, have lower incomes, and are less proficient in English than Americans (US Census 
Bureau 2009, Kuziemko 2007). These facts suggest that immigrants’ returns from participation 
in the formal labor market are on average lower than those of natives. Thus, a rise in the share of 
immigrants in the population may lead to an increase in crime rates. As participation in the 
formal labor market is a more relevant outside option for crimes motivated by financial gain than 
for “crimes of passion”, it is reasonable to expect this mechanism to increase the property crime 
rate, but not necessarily the rate of violent crime. 
On the other side, expected costs of committing a crime are arguably higher for immigrants. 
Not only do they face the same set of punishments as natives, they are also subject to 
deportation. Losing the right to reside legally in the US may be a major deterrent. 
Another channel through which immigration may affect crime are spillover effects. Borjas, 
Grogger and Hanson (2010) argue that immigration caused a decline in wages and employment 
among black men and thereby led to an increase in incarceration rates for this group. Thus, 
immigration could cause an increase in crime rates, even if immigrants commit fewer crimes 
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than observationally similar natives. Therefore, there are a priori reasons to believe that 
immigration does increase crime rates, although the direction of the effect is theoretically 
indeterminate. 
 
III. DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The data set used in this paper is a decadal panel of county level observations running from 1980 
to 2000.9 With a few exceptions concentrated in the states of Alaska and Virginia, borders of 
counties and county equivalents have remained mostly static during this period (US Census 
Bureau 1994).10 By contrast the Census Bureau has used different definitions to describe 
metropolitan areas, resulting in a lack of comparability across decades.11 Although the majority 
of immigrants reside within metropolitan areas, lack of comparability over time might be an 
important confounding factor that makes county level data preferable to data at the city or MSA 
level. Information on county characteristics in various years is provided by the US Census 
Bureau in its City and County Data Books and USA Counties. Both publications contain a 
collection of data from the Census Bureau itself and other government agencies based on, for 
instance, Decennial Censuses of Population and Housing, Censuses of Government, Economic 
Censuses, etc.  
As is customary in the literature on immigration, a person’s place of birth is used to 
determine his immigration status. That is, the number of immigrants in a county equals the 
foreign born population. The Census attempts to collect information from every resident in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 While the FBI started collecting crime statistics in 1930 and makes data available for years as early as 1960, data 
for earlier years is problematic due to low reporting rates of police agencies. Although immigrant inflows started to 
increase after World War II, abolishment of national-origin quotas through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 is usually associated with the beginning of the most recent immigration episode. 
10 Counties which could not be matched consistently over time have been dropped from the analysis. The final 
sample includes 3,117 counties. See the Data Appendix for further details. 
11 See Jaeger et al. (1998) for a detailed explanation of different definitions and an attempt at creating a time 
consistent mapping. 
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US, including illegal aliens. Yet there remains uncertainty about the exact number of legal and 
illegal immigrants, particularly among Hispanics (Hainer et al. 1988, Hogan and Robinson 
1993).12 Therefore, the number of foreign-born in a county is likely to be measured with error. 
Dollar values have been converted to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers, and control variables, for which no information is available in a particular 
year, have been linearly interpolated based on the two closest available years. The Data 
Appendix names the exact source of each variable used throughout the paper and provides a 
detailed description of the data construction procedures. 
All measures of crime are based on agency level data on the number of crimes reported to 
the police, as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in its Uniform Crime 
Reporting program.13 Reported crime data are available for the seven Index I crimes: murder, 
rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Precise definitions 
are provided in the Data Appendix. The first four of these are classified as violent crimes; the 
latter three are denoted property crimes. The number of crimes reported to the FBI each month 
have been adjusted for non-reporting by agencies to yield a reliable yearly measure, and have 
been aggregated to the county level.14  
On theoretical grounds data on actual victimizations would be preferable to reported crimes. 
However, such data are unavailable at the required level of geographic disaggregation.15 Since 
crime serves as dependent variable, underreporting and, more generally, measurement error in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 In the 1990 Census, for instance, the undercount rate is estimated be 5% for Hispanics compared to .7% for 
Whites (Hogan and Robinson 1993). 
13 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to using data on arrests instead of reported crimes. Data on 
arrests are available by race, age, and gender, but no information on the immigration status of the offender is 
available. 
14 Again, the Data Appendix provides a detailed description of this procedure. The results presented in this paper are 
robust to using different adjustment mechanisms. 
15 O'Brien (1985) and Gove, Hughes, and Geerken (1985) provide opposing views on the validity of reported crime 
data. 
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the number of crimes will not bias the point estimates unless it is correlated with one of the 
independent variables. If, for instance, immigrants were less likely to report a crime than natives, 
then the point estimates would be biased downwards; thus understating the impact of 
immigration of crime.16 The fact that the estimated elasticities are robust to using first 
differences instead of levels, even controlling for county fixed effects in growth rates, makes it 
unlikely that classical measurement error drives the results. 
Summary statistics based on the raw, unweighted data for all variables used throughout the 
analysis are presented in Table 2. There exists large variation in crime rates across counties and 
over time. Most violent crimes are aggravated assaults, while the majority of property crimes are 
larcenies. Crime rates increase until the late 1980s, or early 1990s and decline thereafter.17 In 
most cases their variance follows a similar pattern. 
The fraction of immigrants exhibits substantial variation across counties, too. As many new 
immigrants settle in major cities, the share of immigrants increases much faster in the right tail of 
the distribution; causing it to spread out (see also Figure 2). Over most of the sample period 90% 
of all counties’ immigrant share is lower than the national average. This explains the relatively 
small mean and its modest increase in Table 2.  
Table 2 also shows that most counties are not very populous, and the majority of them lie in 
the South and Midwest. The imbalance in population and the number of immigrants across 
counties necessitates the use of appropriate weights in the analysis to follow.18  
 
IV. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON CRIME !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 There is also the less plausible possibility of increased reporting in counties with a high share of immigrants, 
leading to an overstatement of the effect of immigration on crime.  
17 As the data in Table 2 is not weighted, crime rates displayed therein do not match those published by the FBI in 
Crime in the United States. 
18 Table 6 demonstrates that the results are qualitatively robust to different weighting schemes. 
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A. Econometric Specification 
The preceding discussion suggests a relationship between immigration and crime rates. In what 
follows this relationship is explored more systematically by using panel data regressions to relate 
the share of immigrants to county-level crime rates. The parameter of interest is the elasticity of 
the rate of crime with respect to the population share of immigrants, which is identified by
! 
" in 
the following linear model: 19 
 
(1) 
! 
ln(crimec,t ) ="ln(immigrantsc,t ) + #ln(populationc,t ) + $ X c,t% + µc +& t +' c,t  
 
where 
! 
crimec,t  denotes the total number of incidences of a particular crime in county 
! 
c  during 
year 
! 
t , 
! 
immigrantsc,t  and 
! 
populationc,t  are the total number of immigrants and residents, 
respectively; 
! 
Xc,t  is a vector of additional county level covariates, 
! 
µc  denotes a county fixed 
effect, and 
! 
" t  a year fixed effect. The error term is given by 
! 
" c,t .
20 
Equation (1) is estimated by weighted least squares using county population as weights. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation in error terms 
over time and across counties within a state. 
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19 To see that 
! 
"  is the elasticity of the rate of crime with respect to the population share of immigrants rearrange (1) 
to yield: 
! 
ln crimec,tpopulationc,t 100,000
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' =(ln immigrantsc,tpopulationc,t
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' + )+( *1( ) ln populationc,t( ) + Xc,t' + + µc + ln 100,000( ) +, t +- c,t . 
20 The results are qualitatively robust to different parametric assumptions about the relationship between crime rates 
and the share of immigrants. The log-log formulation in (1) is chosen because it is easy to interpret and fits the data 
well. E.g. a semi-parametric estimator similar to the one presented by Yatchew (1998) suggests a relationship that is 
linear in logs. The data clearly rejects a model that is linear in both the crime rate and the share of immigrants. 
Letting the log of the crime rate or its level be a function that is linear in polynomials of the share of immigrants 
yields similar results for most observations in the sample, but for those in the far right tail of the immigrant share 
distribution. Only for roughly 5% of counties do the results depend on the functional relationship in equation (1). A 
disadvantage of estimating a model that is linear in polynomials of the immigrant share and includes county fixed 
effects is that there is very little residual variation in the share of immigrants, which makes the point estimates 
sensitive to outliers. 
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The full set of additional county level covariates consists of controls for changes in 
demographics, police enforcement, economic conditions, as well as quality and availability of 
housing. County fixed effects absorb characteristics that are constant over time. 
Covariates controlling for changes in demographic composition are the fraction of residents 
that are female and the median age of the population. The natural logarithm of police expenditure 
per capita and the log of the rate of institutionalization proxy for police enforcement; while the 
fraction of families below the poverty line, logged median household income, payroll per capita, 
and the unemployment rate proxy for economic conditions. The number of new building permits 
per existing unit, the fraction of housing units that are vacant, the fraction of owner occupied 
units, as well as the median rent and value of housing units control for factors affecting the 
quality and availability of housing. 
In choosing covariates one must be cautious not to control for endogenous factors. For 
instance, immigrants and natives do differ on observables such as age, race, ethnicity, and 
income. By fully controlling for these characteristics 
! 
" would not reflect the true effect of 
immigration on crime any more. On the other hand, characteristics of a county’s population may 
change over time for reasons unrelated to immigration. To the extent that the characteristics are 
correlated with crime one needs to control for them in order to obtain unbiased estimates. The 
particular set of covariates chosen tries to strike a balance between these two conflicting 
objectives. As shown in the following subsection, the results are not very sensitive to inclusion 
of specific controls. 
At this point it is useful to point out how  is identified. By including county and year fixed 
effects in the econometric model only within county variation from national patterns over time 
identifies the coefficients. This means that unobserved county characteristics that are constant, or ! 
"
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year effects common to all counties cannot bias the point estimate of 
! 
". Only unobservables that 
do vary over time and across counties are a potential source of bias, as they might be correlated 
with the residual variation in the share of immigrant. For instance, new immigrants might, ceteris 
paribus, be less likely to settle in a county experiencing a crime shock. Section IV.C addresses 
the issue of causality. 
 
B. Main Results 
Table 3 presents a series of estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to immigration. The 
dependent variable in columns (1)–(7) is the natural logarithm of the number of property crimes, 
while that in columns (8)–(14) is the log of the number of violent crimes. Consequently, the 
coefficients on Log Immigrants in the first seven columns identify the elasticity of the property 
crime rate with respect to immigration, and the coefficients in the last seven columns identify 
that of the violent crime rate. The set of fixed effects and the vector of other covariates included 
in the regression, i.e. 
! 
µc , 
! 
" t , and
! 
Xc,t , varies across columns. Moving from left to right the set of 
covariates and fixed effects steadily grows. 
Columns (1) and (8) show the relationship between crime rates and the share of immigrants 
without accounting for fixed effects or any other covariates besides population. Due to weighting 
by population these correlations are very different from those implied by Figures 4A and 4B. 
Weighting induces a negative relationship between immigration and both property crimes and 
violent crimes. The high 
! 
R2 indicates that population size explains most of the variation in the 
number of crimes across counties. Adding year fixed effects in columns (2) and (9) increases the 
coefficients, but does not change their signs and explains little additional variation in crime. In 
no case is the coefficient of interest statistically different from zero. 
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Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across counties by including county fixed effects 
changes the picture dramatically. Unobservable county characteristics are highly correlated with 
residual variation in the share of immigrants. This suggests that controlling for unobservable 
county characteristics important in obtaining unbiased parameter estimates. The effect of 
immigration on violent crime rates is now positive, but is estimated imprecisely. The effect on 
property crime rates is roughly twice large, positive, and statistically significant. 
The controls for demographics as well as for police enforcement have little effect. The same 
is true for controls related economic conditions, despite the fact that one might expect economic 
prosperity to be negatively correlated with crime.21 
One might also argue that immigrants are more dependent on affordable housing than 
natives, and that high crime rates depress housing prices. Failing to control for this effect would 
bias the estimated elasticity of crime with respect to immigration upwards. Therefore, columns 
(7) and (14), which display the results of the preferred specification, also include proxies for 
quality and availability of housing. 
The point estimate of 
! 
" for violent crimes is .065 and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. The elasticity of property crime rates with respect to the share of immigrants, however, is 
estimated to be .123 and is statistically significant. This constitutes an economically large effect. 
Taken at face value, a 10% increase in the share of immigrants would lead to an increase in the 
property crime rate of circa 1.23%. 
To put this number into perspective, Levitt (1997) finds that a 10% increase in the number 
of sworn police officers reduces property crime rates by 2–4%.22 Levitt (1996) estimates the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 In the economic model of crime (Becker 1968) changes in macroeconomic conditions have an indeterminate 
effect on crime rates, as they possibly affect both criminals’ outside options as well as the returns to crime. 
Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that changes in macroeconomic conditions have only a small impact 
on crime rates (see for instance Levitt 2004 and the studies cited therein). 
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elasticity of property crime rates with respect to the prison population to be -.321, i.e. a 10% 
increase in the number of prisoners decreases property crime rates by circa 3.2%. To gauge the 
size of the estimates it is also useful to convert them into relative crime rates.23 By this measure 
an elasticity of .123 implies that immigrants commit circa 2.5 as many crimes as the average 
native.24 
An alternative way of estimating the elasticity of crime rates is by using first differences, i.e.  
 
(2) 
! 
" ln(crimec,t ) =#" ln(immigrantsc,t ) + $" ln(populationc,t ) + "Xc,t' % + "& t + "' c,t  
 
where 
! 
"  denotes the difference between year 
! 
t  and 
! 
t "10  for the variable following it, and 
! 
" is 
again the parameter of interest. With access to only two time periods the parameter estimates of 
model (1) and model (2) would be algebraically equivalent. Given multiple periods differences 
arise; especially in the presence of measurement error, which generally affects the first 
differences model more severely. The fact that the estimated elasticities in Table 4 are close to 
those in Table 3, or even larger, suggests that measurement error is not a substantial problem.25 
Some of the other coefficients change sign and vary in size, but are often estimated imprecisely. 
Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 add county fixed effects to model (2). This has the 
interpretation of controlling for county specific growth rates. Individual counties could be on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Levitt’s (1997) point estimates of the elasticity of violent crime rates with respect to sworn police officers are 
roughly two to three times larger. 
23 To do so one solves a system of two equations in two unknowns, i.e. the crime rate of immigrants and that of 
natives, in which the two equations are given by 
! 
# immigrants*crime rateimmigrants+# natives*crime ratenatives =#crimes  and 
! 
1+"( )# immigrants*crime rateimmigrants + # natives #"# immigrants( )*crime ratenatives = 1+"$( )#crimes
The second equation gives the number of crimes after a counterfactual increase in the fraction of immigrants by 
! 
"  
(and a corresponding decrease in the fraction of natives). 
! 
"  denotes the estimated elasticity of crime with respect to 
the share of immigrants. All other variables take on their respective values for 2007. 
24 If arrest rates are any indication, then composition effects can account for at most a ten percent difference in crime 
rates. 
25 Strictly speaking this is only true for classical errors in variables. More general patterns of measurement error may 
still be present and bias the point estimates. 
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very different trajectories, which might influence settlement of patterns of forward-looking 
immigrants, and thus be a source of bias. Controlling for county specific growth rates does not 
alter the estimated effect of immigration on violent crimes. It remains close to zero. The 
estimated elasticity for property crimes decreases slightly, but is very similar to that shown in 
Table 3 and statistically significant. It appears that controlling for existing trends does not 
change the results in a meaningful way. 
 
C. Causality 
The evidence on the impact of immigration on crime presented so far is only correlational. A 
causal interpretation of the parameter estimates requires the residuals in equations (1) or (2) to be 
uncorrelated with the (actual) log of number of immigrants, conditional on all other covariates. 
There are at least three reasons why this may fail. The first one is measurement error in the 
number of immigrants. Measurement error would attenuate the estimated elasticities, thus 
masking the impact of immigration on crime.26 The second reason is omitted variables bias. For 
omitted variables bias to be a problem there must be some variable not accounted for in the 
empirical model for which, conditional on all other covariates, the deviations from its county 
specific mean and the national average in a given year are correlated with those deviations for 
the log number of immigrants and the deviations of crime. Depending on the signs of these 
partial correlations the point estimates might be upward or downward biased. The third reason is 
endogeneity in the settlement pattern of immigrants. All else equal, one would expect 
immigrants to settle in counties with lower crime rates. This would introduce a negative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Strictly speaking this results is based on the assumption of classical errors in variables. It can be shown, however, 
that attenuation bias will often result for non-classical measurement error as well. 
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correlation between the residual and the share of immigrants, and biase the point estimate of 
! 
" 
downward. 
Estimation using instrumental variables (IV) provides a way to avoid aforementioned 
problems and obtain an estimate of the causal effect—at least if measurement error is classical 
and heterogeneity in effects is absent. With heterogeneity in effects, IV estimates provides a 
local average treatment effect. That is, the point estimate is a weighted average of marginal 
effects, with groups for which the instrument is a better predictor receiving more weight.27 For 
more general forms of measurement error it is easy to show that the IV estimate are often upward 
biased. Despite the inherent problems with IV, it is desirable to test whether the results for the 
impact of immigration on crime hold up. 
Consistency of the first differences estimator in equation (2) requires an instrument that is 
correlated with the change in number of immigrants in county  at time , but does not 
influence the period  change in crime in  except through changes in the number of 
immigrants. More precisely, for some 
! 
Zc,t  to be a valid instrument it must be the case that 
! 
Cov Zc,t* ," log immigrantsc,t( )
*[ ] # 0  and 
! 
Cov Zc,t* ,"#c,t[ ] = 0 , where 
! 
*  denotes the residual 
variation in the respective variable.28 
Previous studies in the immigration and wage literature have recognized immigrants’ 
tendencies to settle in ethnic clusters (Bartel 1989), and used it to predict current period inflows 
of new immigrants (i.e. Altonji and Card 1991, Card 2001). This paper takes the same approach. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) derive the IV weights and show that some of these weights might even be 
negative, in particular if the monotonicity condition of Imbens and Angrist (1994) fails. 
28 In contrast to the first differences estimator, consistency of the fixed effects estimator in equation (1) requires 
strict exogeneity of the instrument. That is, it requires 
! 
Cov Zc,t* ,"c,s[ ] = 0, for all 
! 
s, t . 
! 
c
! 
t
! 
t
! 
c
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That is, the predicted change in the logarithm of the number of immigrants from year 
! 
t "10  to 
! 
t  
is used to instrument for the actual change. 
Predicted changes in the number of immigrants are derived based on the assumption that the 
distribution of new immigrants across counties is will be the same as the distribution of 
immigrants of their own ethnic group twenty years prior. The instrument therefore exploits 
geographic and ethnic dispersion in settlement patterns as well as the changing ethnic 
composition of immigrants. The Data Appendix provides an exact description of how the 
instrument was constructed. 
While the first condition for a valid instrument undoubtedly holds, i.e. the instrument is a 
strong predictor of 
! 
" log immigrantsc,t( )
*
 in the sense of Stock and Yogo (2005) (see the first 
stage F-statistic in Table 5), it is less clear that the second condition is satisfied. Intuitively, 
validity of the exclusion restriction requires that differences in the geographic distribution across 
immigrant groups, and total inflows of different groups are uncorrelated with shocks to crime in 
particular counties. Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be tested. 
If one accepts this assumption, then Table 5 display estimates of the causal effect of 
immigration on crime. The IV point estimates are remarkably close to the OLS estimates, but are 
estimated less precisely. Nevertheless, it appears that the original set of conclusions continues to 
hold. 
 
D. Implications of the Economic Model of Crime 
As hinted above economic theory predicts that the effect of immigration on crime depends on the 
difference in outside options between natives and immigrants. This means that there should be an 
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effect of immigration primarily on those crimes for which there is a clear difference, and that the 
effect should be larger for immigrant groups whose outside options are lower.29 
One can take a closer look at the effect of immigration by estimating the respective 
elasticities for different types of property and violent crimes. Table 6 presents OLS and IV 
elasticity estimates with burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, murder, rape, aggravated assault, 
and robbery as the dependent variables. The OLS point estimates suggest that immigration 
increases all three types of property crime as well as robberies. The estimates for these crimes 
range in size from .115 to .274 and are each statistically significant. The effect of immigration on 
the remaining violent crimes is less clear. While 
! 
" is positive, small, and statistically 
insignificant for rape as well as aggravated assault, it is positive, marginally significant, and 
sizeable for murder. With the exception of murder and burglary, the IV estimates are again 
similar to their OLS counterparts. Accounting for uncertainty in the point estimates it appears 
that, consistent with the economic model of crime, immigration increases rates of crimes 
motivated by financial gains, but not “crimes of passion”. 
Previous research has documented that immigrants from Mexico have significantly worse 
labor market outcomes than not only natives, but also other immigrant groups (see, for instance, 
Borgas and Katz 2007). With this motivation in mind Table 7 shows OLS elasticity estimates 
with respect to immigrants from Mexico as well as “all other” immigrants. The estimated effect 
on crime of Mexican immigration is positive, and statistically significant for all crimes motivated 
by financial gain. The effect of “all other” immigrants, however, is in all cases negative. 
Converted into crime rates, the estimates in Table 7 imply that immigrants from Mexico commit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Other factors, such as the severity of punishment, might also differ between natives and immigrants and might 
mask the effect due to differences in outside options. 
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between 3.5 and 5 times as many crimes as the average native, while “all other” immigrants 
commit less than half as many crimes as natives, or even none. 
 
E. Sensitivity and Robustness 
Tables 8A and 8B explore the sensitivity of the estimated elasticities across different 
specifications and a wide variety of subsamples of the data. Only coefficients on Log Immigrants 
and associated standard errors are reported. The first row in each table displays the baseline 
results, i.e. those from the preferred specification.30  
The following two rows show that weighting has little influence on the point estimates, 
although it does decrease them. In particular, results corrected for missing observations by 
inverse probability weighting (IPW) are almost identical to the baseline results.31 Weighting 
seems to matter only for the elasticity of murder with respect the share of immigrants. 
In general, the estimates for murder vary widely across specifications and samples. 
However, those for other types of crime are much more robust, especially those for crimes 
motivated by financial gain. 
Splitting the sample up by year and analyzing each cross-section separately shows that the 
effect of immigration on property crimes is concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000. This is 
consistent with existing evidence on lower labor market returns for this later cohort of 
immigrants (e.g. Borjas 1990). 
Of the 116 estimated elasticities for burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery, only 
9 do not carry the expected sign, e.g. are negative. If all coefficients were independently !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Results from quantile regressions (available upon request) are very similar to those obtained by OLS, in particular 
at the median of the distribution. 
31 IPW weights each observation by the inverse of the predicted probability of having a non-missing value. This is a 
valid non-parametric correction procedure if the probability of an observation containing missing information does 
not depend on unobservables. 
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distributed—which is an obvious oversimplification—the probability that 9 or fewer of them 
would be negative is effectively zero if immigration had no effect on crimes related to monetary 
gain. Thus, one would reject the null that the elasticity of these crimes with respect to the share 
of immigrants is non-positive.32 Of the 87 estimated elasticities for murder, rape, and aggravated 
assault, however, 28 are negative. While this is less than the expected value under the null with 
independently distributed coefficients (and would still lead to rejection of the null), once one 
takes into account that the estimates are probably positively correlated the null appears less 
implausible. 
There is some evidence that the effect of immigration on crime in the Northeast differs from 
that in the rest of the country. With the exception of robbery, all elasticity estimates are negative 
for this region—often implausibly much so. One admittedly unsatisfactory explanation is that the 
Northeast receives proportionately less immigrants with poor labor market prospects. For 
instance, the fraction of immigrants from Mexico is lower in the Northeast, than in the South and 
the West.  
 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
To facilitate interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated effects and to aid in drawing 
conclusions for public policy, estimates of the social cost of an immigration-induced increase in 
crime are required. This section performs back of the envelope calculations for a counterfactual 
increase in the stock of immigrants by 10%. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 To see this, note that if the effect of immigration on these crimes is zero, then the probability of one coefficient 
being negative is one half, and the probability of any number of them being negative is binomially distributed. The 
probability that 17 or fewer of them are negative is given by 
! 
Pr #" 9( ) = B j,.5( )
j=0
9
# , where 
! 
B j,.5( )  denotes the 
binomial probability mass function for 
! 
j  successes given the respective number of tries and a success probability of 
.5. 
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Following Levitt (1996), estimates by Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman 
(1993) of monetary and quality of life losses due to crime are used to derive the social cost of an 
immigration-induced increase in crime. These papers attempt to capture both monetary costs, 
such as property loss, medical bills, decreases in productivity, etc., as well as reductions in the 
quality of life due to victimization. Estimates of reductions in the quality of life are based on jury 
awards in civil suits (excluding punitive damages), which are mapped into distributions for a 
variety of injuries associated with different types of crime. As these cost estimates correspond to 
the average crime and the average crime might be more serious than the marginal one, they may 
overstate the cost of the marginal crime. The cost estimates, however, do not include expenses 
related to victim precaution, legal fees, or losses to employers. 
Another important caveat in interpreting the following cost estimates is that they rely on the 
assumption that the cost of reported and unreported crimes are equal. According to the National 
Crime Victimization Survey in 2007 less than 40% of all crimes were reported to the police (US 
Department of Justice 2010). Even serious crimes, such as aggravated assault and robbery, have 
reporting rates of less than two thirds. Moreover, it is assumed that the elasticity of each type of 
crime with respect to the share of immigrants is the same for reported and unreported crimes. 
This assumption is potentially problematic, as crimes committed by and especially against 
immigrants might be less likely to be reported. 
Table 9 presents estimated yearly cost from a counterfactual increase in the share of 
immigrants by 10%. The values in Table 9 are in 2007 dollars and based on the number of 
crimes in 2007 as well as the OLS elasticity estimates in Table 6, rather than the ones obtained 
from IV. Choosing the more robust OLS estimates is likely to overstate social cost, as—with the 
exception of robbery—the OLS estimates are about as high or higher than the IV ones (in 
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particular for murder and rape). For consistency, Table 9 also takes the potential impact of 
immigration on “crimes of passion” into account. Excluding murder would lower the estimated 
costs substantially. Consequently, the cost estimates reported in Table 9 should be taken with a 
grain of salt. They are most likely upper bounds.33 
Columns 1 and 2 show the estimated increase in the number of reported and unreported 
crimes for each type of offense, respectively. The bulk of the increase in the number of crimes is 
due to less costly property crimes. Columns 3 and 4 are the Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and 
Rossman (1993) cost estimates inflated to 2007 dollars.34 Violent crimes, in particular murder, 
are much more costly than property crimes. The costs associated with property crimes are almost 
exclusively monetary, while much of the cost associated with violent crime is due to reductions 
in the quality of life. Column 5 combines the information in the preceding columns and displays 
the estimated yearly social cost due to changes in crime following a counterfactual increase in 
the share of immigrants. 
Estimated costs for crimes related to monetary gain sum to slightly more than 750 million 
dollars per year. Cost due to “crimes of passion” sum to roughly 1 billion dollars, with murder 
accounting for more than 80%. Even a relatively modest increase in murders leads to large social 
costs, whereas changes in rapes have relatively small effects. The estimated (upper bound of) 
total social cost is 1.7 billion dollars per year. Considering the nature of the previous 
assumptions and the variability in the underlying elasticity estimates, in particular the ones with 
respect to aggravated assault and murder, this number should be interpreted with caution. 
Despite the substantial uncertainty surrounding this cost estimate, it is useful to put it into 
perspective. In 2007 the Department of Homeland Security spent circa 12 billion dollars on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Using the IV point estimates instead of the OLS ones would decrease estimated total cost by approximately 60%. 
34 The estimates in Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993) update and extent those of Cohen (1988), but are only 
available for violent crimes. 
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border protection and immigration and customs enforcement (US Department of Homeland 
Security 2007). Concern about an immigration induced in crime alone is certainly not sufficient 
to rationalize the magnitude of these expenditures. 
 Another way to put the cost estimate into perspective is to contrast it with estimates of the 
benefits of immigration (accruing to natives). Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) have estimated 
an annual gain to the US economy due to the post-1979 inflow of immigrants into the labor 
market between .05 and .13 percent of GDP.35 In 2007 this amounts to approximately 7-18 
billion dollars. 
Under the assumption that the elasticity of crime with respect to the share of immigrants is 
constant, the cost estimates in Table 9 can be extrapolated. Between 1980 and 1995, the last year 
considered by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), the share of immigrants increased by almost 
50%.36 This yields a yearly cost estimate of approximately 7 billion dollars, which, again, should 
be interpreted as close to the upper bound. This suggests that the costs due to an increase in 
crime associated with an influx of immigrants do most likely not outweigh the gains produced 
elsewhere in the economy. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The economic theory of crime pioneered by Becker (1968) predicts that, all else equal, 
individuals with lower outside options commit more crimes than others. While immigrants are 
known to have lower levels of education, lower wages, and higher unemployment rates than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The last year taken into account by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) is 1995. Since immigration continued to 
increase, their estimate understates the current welfare gain to immigration. Somewhat ironically the “immigration 
surplus” rises with its (negative) impact wages (see Borjas 1999 for an exposition), which means that the welfare 
gain to immigration increases with the price elasticity of labor demand. Studies simulating the economic impact of 
immigration for a variety of elasticity values have found an immigration surplus between .01 and .3 percent of GDP 
(see Borjas 1999 and the studies cited therein). 
36 This equals approximately .4 log points. 
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natives, previous studies have not found a relationship between immigration and crime, or 
proxies thereof. 
Using decadal panel data on US counties from 1980 to 2000 this paper presents empirical 
evidence of a systematic and economically meaningful impact of immigration on crime. A 10% 
increase in the share of immigrants—roughly one percentage point based on numbers from the 
2000 Census—is estimated to lead to an increase in the property crime rate of circa 1.2%, while 
the rate of violent crimes remains essentially unaffected. To put this into perspective, an 
elasticity of .12 implies that the average immigrant commits roughly 2.5 times as many property 
crimes as the average native. 
Consistent with economic theory an effect of immigration on crime is stronger for crimes 
motivated by financial gain, for instance robbery or motor vehicle theft, but not for “crimes of 
passion”, such as rape, and aggravated assault. The former are precisely the types of crime for 
which Becker’s (1968) model seems most applicable, and for which the relevant outside option 
is most likely legal sector employment. Moreover, the effect of immigration is only present for 
immigrants from Mexico, who are more likely than others to have poor labor market outcomes. 
The social cost of increased crime due to immigration is substantial. Failure to account for 
the cost of increased crime would overstate the social gain to a counterfactual 10% percent 
increase in the fraction of immigrants by as much as 1.7 billion dollars per year. Despite the 
uncertainty associated with this cost estimate, it is most likely too small to outweigh the welfare 
gains to immigration produced elsewhere in the economy. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
A. Crime Data 
All measures of crime are based on agency level data on the number of crimes reported to the 
police, as compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in its Uniform Crime 
Reporting program and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR). Data for 1980 and 1990 are contained in Study No. 9028, and information on 
reported crimes in 2000 is distributed as part of Study No. 3447. 
The number of reported offenses is available for the seven Index I crimes: murder, rape, 
aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The FBI classifies the 
first four of these as violent crimes; the latter three are denoted property crimes. A single 
reported incident involving different crimes is scored only once. It is counted only under the 
most serious crime involved. E.g. two offenders breaking into a car dealership killing the night 
guard in the process would be counted as one homicide, not as burglary. See U.S. Department of 
Justice (2004) for a detailed guide on scoring and classifying offenses. 
Data on reported crimes are available at the national, state, county, and agency level. Due to 
changes in the imputation procedures in 1994 county level data before and after 1994 are not 
comparable. This necessitates the use of agency level data, which has to be appropriately 
adjusted for non-reporting by police agencies and aggregated to the county level. That is, if a 
police agency submits reports for at least 1 month, but less than 12, in a given year, the total 
number of crimes it reports for this year is inflated by a factor of 
! 
12# reports . Agencies 
reporting 0 months are not considered.  
An alternative way of adjusting for non-reporting suggested by the National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) is to inflate the number of reported crimes for agencies 
submitting reports for at least 3 months by a factor of 
! 
12# reports , and to assign an imputed 
value to agencies reporting 2 or fewer months. NACDJ uses the mean value of agencies 
reporting 12 months in the same geographic stratum for its imputations.37 This method has the 
downside that it introduces substantial correlation in the error terms across counties. The results 
remain qualitatively unchanged when using the alternative adjustment mechanism. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See the description at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html> for details. 
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Aggregating agency level crime data to the county level is done by adding the adjusted 
number of crimes of all agencies in a given county. ICPSR Study No. 4634 provides a crosswalk 
between agency identifiers (ORI) and county codes (FIPS). 
To avoid loosing approximately one third of the sample, data for 1970 (distributed in ICPSR 
Study No. 4198) has been used in estimating the first differences models in Tables 4 and 5. 
For the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 the following variables are used in the analysis: 
 
Violent Crimes is the sum of all murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies known to 
police in a given county during a particular year. 
Murder refers to the crime of murder and non-negligent manslaughter and is defined as the 
willful non-negligent killing of a human being by another one. 
Rape refers to the crime of rape by force. Rape by force defined as the carnal knowledge of a 
female forcibly against her will, where carnal knowledge is the act of a man having sexual 
intercourse with a woman. 
Aggravated Assault is defined as an unlawful attack by one person upon another one for the 
purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury. Aggravated assaults are often accompanied by the use 
of a weapon.  
Robbery is defined as the taking or attempt to take anything valuable from its owner or 
custodian by force, threat of force, or intimidation. Both armed and unarmed robberies are 
subsumed in this category. 
Property Crimes is the sum of all burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts known to 
police in a given county during a particular year. 
Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry into a structure with the intent to commit a felony or 
theft. Forcible entry, unlawful entry without the use of force, and attempted forcible entry are 
subsumed in this category. 
Larceny, or theft, is defined as the unlawful taking away of property from the possession of its 
owner or custodian. Pocket-picking, purse-snatching, shoplifting, thefts from motor vehicles, 
thefts of motor vehicle parts and accessories, theft of bicycles, theft from buildings, theft from 
coin-operated devices or machines, etc. are included in this category. 
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Motor Vehicle Theft is defined as the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor 
vehicle is defined as a self-propelled vehicle running on land surface and not on rails. 
 
B. County Level Covariates 
In its City and County Data Books and USA Counties the US Census Bureau publishes 
information on county characteristics in various years. Both publications contain a collection of 
data from the Census Bureau itself and other government agencies based on, for instance, 
Decennial Censuses of Population and Housing, Censuses of Government, Economic Censuses, 
etc. 
As information in USA Counties for years prior to 1977 is very sparse, data for preceding 
years, which is used in estimating the first differences models, has been taken from the City and 
County Data Books for 1967, 1972 and 1977. USA Counties has been obtained from the US 
Census Bureau website;38 and ICPSR Study No. 2896 contains the data from the City and County 
Data Books used in this paper. 
All dollar values have been converted to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers, and control variables, for which no information is available in a particular 
year, have been linearly interpolated based on the two closest available years. For instance, in the 
raw data Police Expenditure per Capita is not available for 1980, but only for 1977 and 1982. A 
value for 1980 is then imputed based on linear interpolation from 1977 to 1982.  
County level information for different years has been merged on FIPS codes. Counties that 
could not be matched consistently over time have been dropped from the analysis. The final 
sample includes 3,117 counties. 
Below follows a description of each variable used in the analysis, and its original source. 
 
Immigrants is defined as the number of foreign-born individuals in a given county during a 
particular year. Information on the foreign-born is contained in the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
U.S. Censuses. The data used in this paper has been obtained from USA Counties for the 1980, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 See <http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml>. 
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1990, and 2000 Censuses, and from the National Historical Geographic Information System 
(NHGIS) for the 1970 Census. 39 
Total Population is defined as the total number of residents in a given county during a particular 
year. It is based on information collected by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 
it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and 
County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Population per Square Mile is defined as the total number of residents per square mile in a 
given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected by the US Census. For 
the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been 
taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Fraction Female is defined as the number of female residents divided by the total number of 
residents in a given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected by the 
US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 
1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 
2896. 
Median Age is defined as the as the age in years of the median person in the age distribution 
within a given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected by the US 
Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it 
has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Region is defined as a set of indicator variables for each of the four Census Bureau Regions: 
West, Midwest, South, and Northeast.40 
Median Household Income is defined as the as the income, inflated to 2000 dollars (using the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers), of the median household in the income 
distribution within a given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected 
by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. 
For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study 
No. 2896. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 USA Counties is available online at <http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml> and data can be obtained from 
NHGIS at <http://www.nhgis.org/>. 
40 See <http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf> for precise definitions of each Census Region.!
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Fraction Families Below Poverty Level is defined as the as number of families below the 
poverty level applicable to a particular year divided by the number of families for whom poverty 
status has been determined in a given county and that year. It is based on information collected 
by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. 
For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study 
No. 2896. 
Payroll per Capita is defined as the as the total private non-farm annual payroll, inflated to 
2000 dollars (using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers), divided by the total 
number of residents in a given county and a particular year. It is based on information collected 
by the US Census Bureau. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA 
Counties. The necessary information is not available for 1970 in the City and County Data Books 
contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Unemployment Rate is defined as the percentage of the civilian labor force that is not employed 
in a given county during a particular year. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been 
obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken from the 1977 City and County Data 
Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. The information in these data sets is based on official 
publications by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Police Expenditure per Capita is defined as all direct general expenditures for police protection 
by local government, inflated to 2000 dollars (using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers), dived by the total number of residents in a given county and a particular year. It is 
based on information collected by the US Census Bureau. For the years 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997 and 2002 it has been obtained from USA Counties, and linearly interpolated. The necessary 
information is not consistently available the City and County Data Books contained in ICPSR 
Study No. 2896 for years preceding 1977. 
Fraction Institutionalized is defined as the number of inmates in institutions, such as prisons, 
jails, and mental institutions, dived by the total number of residents in a given county and a 
particular year. It is based on information collected by the US Census Bureau. For the years 
1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken from 
ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
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Median Value of Housing Units is defined as the as the value, inflated to 2000 dollars (using 
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers), of the median housing unit in the value 
distribution within a given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected 
by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. 
For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study 
No. 2896. 
Median Rent is defined as the as the rent, inflated to 2000 dollars (using the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers), of the median housing unit in the rent distribution within a 
given county during a particular year. It is based on information collected by the US Census. For 
the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been 
taken from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Fraction of Housing Units Owner Occupied is defined as the number of housing units that are 
occupied by their respective owners divided by the total number of housing units in a given 
county during a particular year. It is based on information collected by the US Census. For the 
years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken 
from the 1972 City and County Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
Fraction of Housing Units Vacant is defined as the number of housing units that are vacant 
divided by the total number of housing units in a given county during a particular year. It is 
based on information collected by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has been 
obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County Data 
Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
New Building Permits per Existing Unit is defined as the number of building permits issued in 
a particular year divided by the total number of housing units in a given county during that year. 
It is based on information collected by the US Census. For the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 it has 
been obtained from USA Counties. For 1970 it has been taken from the 1972 City and County 
Data Book contained in ICPSR Study No. 2896. 
 
C. Construction of Instrument 
County level information on the number of immigrants from different source countries by decade 
(based on the respective US Census) is distributed by the National Historical Geographic 
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Information System (NHGIS). Data for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 have been 
obtained from there, and have been merged with the previously described data. 
In creating the instrument the set of countries in the raw data has been aggregated up into 
nine groups: Northwestern Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, Mexico, South and 
Central America, Africa, Canada, and all other countries. The total number of immigrants in each 
group for the US as a whole as well as for each county separately has been determined for each 
year, i.e. 
! 
immigrantsc,g,tc"  and 
! 
immigrantsc,g,t , where 
! 
t  indexes years, 
! 
c  counties, and 
! 
g  
denotes one of those nine source country groups. County  
! 
c’s predicted total number of 
immigrants in year 
! 
t  is defined as 
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The predicted change in the natural logarithm of the number of immigrants from year 
! 
t "10  to 
! 
t
, e.g. the actual instrument used in the paper, then equals 
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41 Observations for which this number could not be determined due to missing information on the composition of 
immigrants have been assigned a value of .5. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively robust to this 
imputation. 
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Figure 1: Yearly Flow of Legal Immigrants into the US, 1820-2008
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Source: Author's calculations based on US Census data.
Source: Author's calculations based on U.S. Census data.
Figure 2: Immigrant Share in the Total Population and Across Counties, 1950-2000
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Figure 3: Trends in Crime Rates, 1960-2000
Notes: The scale of the ordinate is logarithmic. Crime rates are defined as the number of 
offenses reported to the police per 100,000 residents. Violent crimes is the sum of reported 
murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies. Property crimes is the sum of reported 
burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts.
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Figure 4A: The Correlation between Property Crime Rates and the Share of Immigrants, 1980-2000
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a county-year. The FBI classifies burglary, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft as property crimes. Crime rates are defined as the number of offenses per 100,000 
residents. See the Data Appendix for precise definitions and sources of all variables.
Figure 4B: The Correlation between Violent Crime Rates and the Share of Immigrants, 1980-2000 
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a county-year. The FBI classifies murder, rape, aggravated 
assault, and robbery as violent crimes. Crime rates are defined as the number of offenses per 100,000 
residents.See the Data Appendix for precise definitions and sources of all variables.
Decade All Counties 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1980–1990 -.087 -.147 -.103 -.081 -.073
(.007) (.026) (.015) (.012) (.011)
1990–2000 -.364 -.414 -.402 -.361 -.163
(.010) (.018) (.020) (.019) (.026)
1980–1990 .173 .260 .155 .164 .177
(.010) (.035) (.021) (.018) (.016)
1990–2000 -.330 -.323 -.359 -.381 -.119
(.013) (.025) (.023) (.029) (.032)
Violent Crimes
Quartile of Percent Increase in Immigrant Share
Notes: Entries are means and standard errors of changes in crime rates. Crime rates are defined as the 
number of offenses reported to the police per 100,000 residents. Violent crimes is the sum of reported 
murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies. Property crimes is the sum of reported burglaries, 
larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts. See the Data Appendix for precise definitions and sources of all 
variables.
Table 1: Percentage Change in Crime Rates by Decade and Quartile of Change in Immigrant Share 
Property Crimes
Variable 1980 1990 2000
Crime:
Violent Crime Rate 225.1 281.4 243.8
(297.5) (372.3) (289.2)
Murder Rate 6.167 5.176 3.284
(9.736) (10.38) (6.930)
Rape Rate 15.78 21.63 20.33
(18.78) (25.70) (21.99)
Aggravated Assault Rate 158.2 210.1 184.1
(171.6) (241.4) (223.6)
Robbery Rate 45.01 44.61 36.09
(152.2) (153.4) (80.06)
Property Crime Rate 2,826 2,641 2,075
(2,064) (1,618) (1,618)
Burglary Rate 882.0 721.4 485.8
(690.1) (558.2) (339.3)
Larceny Rate 1,771 1,748 1,446
(1,451) (1,425) (1,170)
Moter Vehicle Theft Rate 172.7 172.2 142.9
(212.3) (285.0) (172.0)
Demographics:
Fraction Immigrants .021 .022 .034
(.028) (.035) (.048)
Total Population (in 1,000) 72.22 79.18 89.61
(236.0) (263.5) (291.9)
Population per Square Mile 209.2 211.5 234.9
(1,569) (1,427) (1,665)
Fraction Female .509 .510 .505
(.016) (.016) (.019)
Median Age 31.05 34.41 37.38
(3.87) (3.60) (3.95)
Region:
Northeast .070 .070 .070
(.256) (.256) (.256)
Midwest .341 .341 .341
(.474) (.474) (.474)
West .134 .134 .134
(.340) (.340) (.340)
South .455 .455 .455
(.498) (.498) (.498)
Economic Indicators:
Median Household Income (in $1,000) 29.76 31.42 35.26
(6.87) (8.47) (8.80)
Fraction of Families Below Poverty .125 .131 .107
(.063) (.070) (.058)
Payroll per Capita (in $1,000) 5.362 5.798 7.164
(3.550) (4.065) (5.388)
Unemployment Rate (in Percent) 6.781 6.641 4.331
(3.314) (3.055) (2.705)
Police Enforcement:
Police Expenditure per Capita 66.17 87.52 109.7
(40.41) (58.03) (72.69)
Fraction Institutionalized .013 .017 .023
(.017) (.021) (.033)
Housing Stock:
Median Value of Housing Units (in $1,000) 73.28 70.82 84.19
(29.24) (44.08) (47.73)
Median Rent 398.1 422.5 440.4
(92.36) (125.9) (121.7)
Fraction of Housing Units Owner Occupied .633 .618 .635
(.089) (.093) (.086)
Fraction of Housing Units Vacant .135 .148 .142
(.098) (.105) (.095)
New Building Permits per Existing Unit .011 .008 .010
(.011) (.010) (.011)
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Decade
Notes: Entries are unweighted means and standard deviations of county level data for those counties whith non-
missing information. The total number of counties in the data set is 3,117. Entries have been rounded to four 
digits. Crime rates are defined as the number of offenses reported to the police per 100,000 residents. Violent 
crimes is the sum of reported murders, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies. Property crimes is the sum of 
reported burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts. See the Data Appendix for precise definitions and sources 
of all variables.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Log Immigrants -.203 -.143 .147 .156 .157 .140 .123 -.227 -.191 .061 .085 .087 .079 .065
(.198) (.218) (.059) (.070) (.068) (.064) (.061) (.203) (.218) (.074) (.074) (.075) (.065) (.063)
Log Total Population 1.415 1.328 .679 .688 .677 .840 1.046 1.590 1.537 .806 .838 .830 .907 1.001
(.224) (.252) (.193) (.184) (.183) (.205) (.249) (.227) (.248) (.164) (.162) (.154) (.172) (.194)
Fraction Female -.098 1.493 .685 .611 -1.771 -.275 .201 .426
(.2.750) (2.320) (3.035) (3.220) (2.340) (2.252) (2.441) (2.310)
Median Age .012 .005 -.012 -.018 .036 .030 .013 .009
(.023) (.022) (.022) (.025) (.017) (.016) (.014) (.016)
Log Police Expenditure per Capita .111 .079 .038 .047 -.016
(.124) (.106) (.099) (.147) (.152)
Log Fraction Institutionalized .112 .034 .016 .054 .044
(.044) (.035) (.034) (.040) (.038)
Log Median Household Income -1.202 -.868 -.732 .098
(.390) (.683) (.442) (.647)
Fraction of Families Below Poverty -7.631 -6.800 -5.941 -4.685
(1.760) (1.778) (1.375) (1.394)
Log Payroll per Capita -.257 -.220 -.205 -.170
(.110) (.106) (.123) (.120)
Unemployment Rate .036 .025 .016 .011
(.011) (.011) (.018) (.019)
New Building Permits per Existing Unit .367 .052
(.981) (1.512)
Fraction of Housing Units Vacant 4.069 2.232
(1.949) (1.468)
Fraction of Housing Units Owner Occupied .571 -.914
(2.038) (1.499)
Median Rent (in $1,000) -.147 -.492
(.397) (.521)
Median Value of Housing Units (in $1,000) -.001 -.001
(.001) (.011)
Constant -6.701 -6.090 -.556 -1.606 -2.115 12.468 5.987 -10.980 -.283 -3.832 -4.647 -5.008 4.214 -4.987
(1.087) (1.278) (2.1540 (1.759) (1.938) (5.863) (6.833) (1.109) (.105) (1.768) (1.900) (1.899) (4.348) (5.284)
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .733 .739 .981 .981 .981 .982 .982 .730 .732 .976 .976 .976 .976 .978
Number of Observations 8,736 8,736 8,736 8,736 8,736 8,736 8,736 8,439 8,439 8,439 8,439 8,439 8,439 8,439
Table 3: Estimates of the Elasticity of Crime with Respect to Immigration
Log Property Crimes Log Violent Crimes
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model, i.e. equation (1), by population weighted least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed 
at the top of each column. The unit of observation is a county-year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. In addition to the variables 
included in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each 
variable.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
! Log Immigrants .180 .123 .028 .011
(.039) (.055) (.039) (.067)
! Log Total Population .656 1.043 1.052 1.326
(.113) (.191) (.091) (.341)
! Fraction Female 2.646 3.476 1.831 2.185
(.754) (1.048) (.706) (1.388)
! Median Age .017 .014 .029 .048
(.008) (.021) (.013) (.031)
! Log Police Expenditure per Capita .163 .012 .097 .040
(.082) (.096) (.120) (.182)
! Log Fraction Institutionalized .082 .002 .026 -.064
(.029) (.027) (.031) (.044)
! Log Median Household Income 1.184 .986 .192 -.062
(.182) (.243) (.197) (.273)
! Fraction of Families Below Poverty -1.512 2.091 -2.247 -.912
(1.115) (1.005) (1.041) (1.870)
! Log Payroll per Capita -.308 -.058 -.240 .056
(.054) (.050) (.075) (.101)
! Unemployment Rate .020 .006 -.014 -.017
(.013) (.014) (.012) (.016)
! New Building Permits per Existing Unit -1.729 -3.907 -1.406 -1.826
(1.264) (1.967) (1.463) (23.009)
! Fraction of Housing Units Vacant .023 .066 .043 .076
(.016) (.028) (.019) (.035)
! Fraction of Housing Units Owner Occupied -1.210 -.997 -1.546 -1.194
(.283) (.483) (.393) (.607)
! Median Rent (in $1,000) .677 .671 .762 .841
(.241) (.420) (.415) (.707)
! Median Value of Housing Units (in $1,000) -.003 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Constant -.482 -.304 -.385 -.058
(.066) (.104) (.067) (.156)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R-Squared .494 .689 .375 .545
Number of Observations 7,992 7,992 7,448 7,448
 !  Log Property Crime  !  Log Violent Crime
Table 4: Estimates of the Elasticity of Crime with Respect to Immigration Using First Differences
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the empirical model in first differences, i.e. equation 
(2), by population weighted least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. The 
unit of observation is a county-year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in 
parentheses. In addition to the variables included in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate 
are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Independent Variable ! Log Property Crime ! Log Violent Crime
! Log Immigrants .108 .010
(.122) (.154)
! Log Total Population .772 1.081
(.207) (.262)
! Fraction Female 2.513 1.798
(.803) (.764)
! Median Age .016 .029
(.009) (.013)
! Log Police Expenditure per Capita .171 .099
(.086) (.125)
! Log Fraction Institutionalized .087 .028
(.030) (.034)
! Log Median Household Income 1.226 .203
(.162) (.196)
! Fraction of Families Below Poverty -1.365 -2.209
(1.056) (1.203)
! Log Payroll per Capita -.314 -.242
(.054) (.071)
! Unemployment Rate .021 -.014
(.013) (.012)
! New Building Permits per Existing Unit -1.765 -1.416
(1.308) (1.468)
! Fraction of Housing Units Vacant .017 .042
(.017) (.022)
! Fraction of Housing Units Owner Occupied -1.135 -1.527
(.272) (.453)
! Median Rent (in $1,000) .719 .772
(.248) (.391)
! Median Value of Housing Units (in $1,000) -.003 -.001
(.001) (.001)
Constant -.460 -.379
(.062) (.089)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
First Stage F-Statistic 74.65 72.76
Number of Observations 7,992 7,448
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating the first differences model by 
population weighted two stage least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed at the top of 
each column. The instrument for ! Log Immigrants at time t is the predicted change in the logarithm of 
immigrants, as explained in the text and the Dtaa Appendix. The unit of observation is a county-year. 
Standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the  First Differences Model
OLS IV
Property Crimes:
Burglary .149 .022
(.067) (.145)
Larceny .115 .131
(.059) (.133)
Motor Vehicle Theft .148 .196
(.091) (.134)
Violent Crimes:
Murder .121 -.047
(.063) (.179)
Rape .048 -.285
(.089) (.197)
Aggravated Assault .036 .026
(.094) (.168)
Robbery .274 .417
(.083) (.184)
Table 6: Estimated Elasticties for Different Types of  Crime
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on from 
estimating  equation (1), by population weighted least squares 
(OLS), and estimating euqation (2) by two-stage least squares (IV). 
The instrument is the same as in Table 5. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the crime listed next the respetive 
coefficient. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered 
by state and reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Log Mexicans Log All Other Immigrants
Property Crimes:
All Property Crimes .066 -.068
(.025) (.035)
Burglary .057 -.091
(.026) (.030)
Larceny .058 -.053
(.026) (.037)
Motor Vehicle Theft .083 -.092
(.028) (.056)
Violent Crimes:
All Violent Crimes .038 -.078
(.024) (.031)
Murder .083 -.061
(.030) (.055)
Rape .059 -.111
(.032) (.050)
Aggravated Assault -.001 -.073
(.029) (.045)
Robbery .095 -.032
(.033) (.048)
Table 7: Estimated Elasticties with Respect to Different Immigrant Groups
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Log Mexicans and Log All 
Other Immigrants from estimating the fixed effects model, i.e equation (1), by 
population weighted least squares. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the crime listed next to the respetive coefficient. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. In addition to 
Log Mexicans and Log All Other Immigrants, all regressions include county fixed 
effects, year fixed effecst, and the full set of covariates.
Independent Variables:
Specification / Sample All Property Crimes Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle Theft
Baseline .123 .149 .115 .148
(.061) (.067) (.059) (.091)
Controlling for Racial Composition .131 .177 .125 .145
(.063) (.061) (.062) (.090)
Unweighted .077 .091 .068 .057
(.038) (.042) (.036) (.046)
Inverse Probability Weighted .121 .146 .113 .142
(.060) (.066) (.058) (.088)
By Year:*
1980 .095 .087 .100 .166
(.063) (.079) (.064) (.078)
1990 .230 .222 .249 .218
(.075) (.099) (.072) (.104)
2000 .257 .262 .258 .251
(.130) (.134) (.127) (.156)
By Tercile of Immigrant Share in 2000:
1st Tercile .037 .052 .083 .014
(.043) (.052) (.047) (.073)
2nd Tercile .124 .142 .107 .165
(.096) (.106) (.092) (.098)
3rd Tercile .175 .242 .148 .222
(.070) (.068) (.073) (.119)
By Tercile of Immigrants Received 1960-2000:
1st Tercile .009 .036 .002 -.012
(.054) (.061) (.056) (.079)
2nd Tercile .231 .273 .220 .210
(.071) (.077) (.061) (.088)
3rd Tercile .250 .315 .228 .222
(.082) (.092) (.086) (.091)
By Region:
West .115 .140 .036 .425
(.061) (.089) (.071) (.184)
Midwest .097 .066 .076 .134
(.077) (.072) (.072) (.123)
Northeast -.238 -.511 -.219 -.362
(.344) (.589) (.326) (.637)
South .045 .065 .042 .030
(.055) (.078) (.048) (.081)
By Tercile of Population in 2000:
1st Tercile .046 .041 .030 .023
(.032) (.034) (.042) (.045)
2nd Tercile .090 .108 .088 .047
(.046) (.050) (.037) (.042)
3rd Tercile .130 .165 .119 .208
(.085) (.090) (.084) (.125)
By Tercile of Population per Square Mile in 2000:
1st Tercile .002 .015 -.015 -.036
(.029) (.042) (.039) (.051)
2nd Tercile .095 .122 .101 .107
(.049) (.059) (.035) (.061)
3rd Tercile .149 .176 .137 .205
(.086) (.089) (.086) (.130)
By Median Household Income in 2000:
1st Tercile .049 .037 .062 .027
(.044) (.061) (.044) (.097)
2nd Tercile .103 .148 .118 .028
(.070) (.099) (.065) (.080)
3rd Tercile .146 .217 .104 .262
(.131) (.080) (.139) (.148)
By Tercile of Average Unemployment Rate:
1st Tercile .201 .210 .190 .257
(.066) (.087) (.066) (.097)
2nd Tercile .163 .158 .151 .250
(.066) (.071) (.064) (.103)
3rd Tercile .048 .151 .044 .026
(.086) (.100) (.082) (.134)
* Does not include county fixed effects.
Elasticity of Crime Rate with Respect to Immigrant Share:
Table 8A: Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions of the Basic Model for Property Crimes
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Log Immigrants from estimating the fixed effects model, i.e. equation (1), by least squares. The respective 
dependent variables are listed at the top of each column. Unless otherwise noted population weights are used. Standard errors are clusered on the state level, except when 
indicated otherwise. The respective sample restriction is indicated at the left of each row.
Specification / Sample All Violent Crimes Murder Rape Aggravated Assault Robbery
Baseline .065 .121 .048 .036 .274
(.063) (.063) (.089) (.094) (.083)
Controlling for Racial Composition .080 .090 .089 .056 .288
(.061) (.045) (.076) (.094) (.082)
Unweighted .006 -.006 -.010 .008 .138
(.142) (.033) (.052) (.056) (.053)
Inverse Probability Weighted .062 .092 .044 .034 .254
(.062) (.055) (.082) (.091) (.078)
By Year:*
1980 .031 -.243 -.149 .107 -.048
(.084) (.054) (.068) (.102) (.084)
1990 .124 -.282 .113 .174 .086
(.103) (.064) (.111) (.113) (.123)
2000 .227 -.108 .059 .307 .215
(.159) (.084) (.057) (.159) (.186)
By Tercile of Immigrant Share in 2000:
1st Tercile -.011 -.024 .006 .033 -.061
(.068) (.103) (.135) (.095) (.056)
2nd Tercile .071 -.035 .125 .052 .263
(.118) (.082) (.090) (.139) (.091)
3rd Tercile .155 .211 .109 .097 .365
(.068) (.095) (.116) (.107) (.102)
By Tercile of Immigrants Received 1960-2000:
1st Tercile -.176 -.057 -.084 -.159 -.018
(.085) (.213) (.170) (.106) (.174)
2nd Tercile .118 .097 .147 .130 .115
(.105) (.099) (.091) (.150) (.093)
3rd Tercile .176 .221 .164 .042 .421
(.064) (.090) (.129) (.084) (.140)
By Region:
West .003 .278 .271 -.070 .257
(.144) (.223) (.121) (.161) (.129)
Midwest .072 .092 -.040 .095 .056
(.117) (.214) (.121) (.166) (.197)
Northeast -.157 -.039 -.289 -.268 .093
(.247) (.409) (.413) (.216) (.431)
South .021 .034 -.036 .028 .157
(.048) (.066) (.098) (.082) (.075)
By Tercile of Population in 2000:
1st Tercile -.076 -.041 -.115 -.052 .034
(.059) (.156) (.056) (.071) (.090)
2nd Tercile .026 .052 -.030 .008 .128
(.055) (.065) (.089) (.067) (.058)
3rd Tercile .087 .144 .064 .044 .342
(.084) (.074) (.115) (.123) (.097)
By Tercile of Population per Square Mile in 2000:
1st Tercile -.114 .038 -.100 -.091 .043
(.064) (.147) (.113) (.078) (.090)
2nd Tercile .004 .021 -.024 -.032 .153
(.051) (.079) (.082) (.067) (.074)
3rd Tercile .125 .150 .078 .098 .337
(.088) (.081) (.117) (.127) (.095)
By Median Household Income in 2000:
1st Tercile .042 .070 .020 .023 .079
(.057) (.076) (.103) (.080) (.079)
2nd Tercile -.010 -.017 .064 -.083 .159
(.090) (.109) (.097) (.103) (.132)
3rd Tercile .121 .169 .079 .082 .382
(.102) (.123) (.111) (.152) (.100)
By Tercile of Average Unemployment Rate:
1st Tercile .107 .119 .080 .056 .352
(.081) (.136) (.122) (.120) (.121)
2nd Tercile .117 .144 -.022 .158 .233
(.082) (.090) (.084) (.100) (.078)
3rd Tercile -.025 .082 .009 -.076 .182
(.105) (.084) (.128) (.124) (.159)
* Does not include county fixed effects.
Table 8B: Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions of the Basic Model for Violent Crimes
Elasticity of Crime Rate with Respect to Immigrant Share:
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors on Log Immigrants from estimating the fixed effects model, i.e. equation (1), by least squares. The respective dependent variables are listed at the 
top of each column. Unless otherwise noted population weights are used. Standard errors are clusered on the state level, except when indicated otherwise. The respective sample restriction is 
indicated at the left of each row.
Monetary Quality of Life Social Cost
Murder 200 0 1,100,000 2,900,000 800,000,000
Rape 430 370 10,500 30,000 30,000,000
Assault 3,100 2,200 5,000 23,000 150,000,000
Robbery 12,200 6,400 5,000 19,000 450,000,000
Burglary 32,500 31,000 1,600 550 140,000,000
Larceny 75,500 168,000 300 0 75,000,000
Motor Vehicle Theft 16,200 2,800 5,400 0 100,000,000
Total 140,130 210,770 -- -- 1,745,000,000
Notes:  Based on the OLS estimates of the elasticities of different types of crime with respect to the share of immigrants reported in Table 6 (assuming 
that the elasticties for reported and unreported crimes are equal). Calculations are based on the total number of each crime in 2007 as reported in US 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2009b). Estimates of reporting rates for each type of crime are from the National Crime Victimization Survey in 2007 (US 
Department of Justice 2010, Table 91). The estimates of the costs of crime are from Cohen (1988) and Miller, Cohen, and Rossman (1993), adjusted to 
2007 dollars using the CPI. The final column displays the estimated social cost of a 10% increase in the stock of immigrants due to changes in each type 
of crime, combining changes in reported and unreported crime. Numbers have been rounded.
Table 9: Estimated Impact on Crime From a Ten Percent Increase in Immigration, Based on 2007 Number of Incidents
Change in Reported 
Crimes
Change in Unreported 
Crimes
Cost per Crime (in USD)
